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Introduction  
 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the trade policy framework of cooperation between the 
European Union (EU) – with special regard to the position of the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEE) – and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The first section – 
focusing on the EU – describes the changing attitudes of the partners concerning upgrading their 
institutional relations, their motivations that led to the present situation, and the main steps taken in 
this process. The second part provides an overview of the existing trade policy framework, the legal 
basis of cooperation, the different types of multi- and bilateral agreements already concluded and 
those under negotiation. This section makes an attempt at mapping the specific interests – if relevant 
and appropriate – of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in developing trade policy relations 
and elaborates on the advantages, as well as the potential risks – if any – for them. The final chapter 
offers a few concluding remarks. 
 
1. The partners’ changing attitudes towards deepening and 
upgrading their cooperation  
1.1. Changing context of the EU trade policy 
 
The main element of the changing landscape of EU relations with its important partners consists in 
renewing its trade policy, including the modification of its position concerning regional and bilateral 
trade, cooperation and Association Agreements. 
 
Since the creation of the WTO, disputes about the reform of EU commercial policy have speeded up. 
The European Commission, in cooperation with interested economic actors and taking into account 
the ambitions of the Member States, has produced several strategy documents aimed at introducing 
new perspectives and directions for and reformulating the priorities of the EU’s common commercial 
policies. The first document published in 1996, “The Global Challenge of International Trade: A Market 
Access Strategy for the European Union”,1 reflects increased activity in the EU intended to implement 
WTO decisions on liberalisation and to extend the scope of bilateral agreements. This pro-active EU 
trade policy period was followed in the first half of the 2000s by a turn to a more cautious and more 
realistic assessment of the EU’s room for manoeuvre in trade policy. This was reflected in the 2004 
Commission document, “Trade Policy in the Prodi Commission: an Assessment”.2 Following the likely 
failure of the Doha Round, the EU took a step back in enforcing far-reaching multilateral rules and 
procedures going beyond classical trade policy (such as government procurement, investment policy, 
competition rules and trade facilitation). The most recent, significant trade policy document is the 2006 
“Global Europe: Competing in the World. A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy”.3  
 
The Commission’s Global Europe communication returns to some extent to its 1996 communication 
by focusing on the liberalisation of tariff and non-tariff barriers, both in multilateral and bilateral frame-
works. This document particularly stressed a fear of disadvantages and worsening of the EU position 
arising from increased attempts by the EU’s main trading partners to conclude bilateral market access 
agreements with third countries. By listing new potential priority partners for future bilateral deals and 
Strategic Partnership agreements (including Latin American countries and groups of countries), the 
Global Europe communication reflected the EU’s readiness to take on a more active role on the 
international scene. At the same time, this document again emphasises the idea of establishing rules 
going beyond classical trade policy, either in multilateral or bilateral form. Global Europe, together with 
                                                       
1 European Commission (1996) 
2 European Commission (2004) 
3 European Commission (2006) 
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stressing the open nature of the European marketplace, also emphasises the improved coordination 
of trade policy with the general macroeconomic and sectoral policy objectives of the EU, in other 
words, the creation of an external competitiveness pillar.  
  
Important changes can be observed in the content and backdrop of trade policy. In previous decades, 
trade policy measures mainly focused on the elimination or phasing out of classical trade policy ba-
rriers. The GATT provides an illustrative example of this developmental stage. Now, liberalisation 
measures and the creation of new practices and codes of conduct that go far beyond classical trade 
policy efforts aiming at the reduction of existing barriers are at the forefront of the international agenda 
on multilateral and bilateral agreements. These newer efforts and ambitions, incuding behind-the-
border rules, environmental requirements, enhanced transparency, stronger consultation mecha-
nisms, and recognition of standards, affect much more than pure market access interests. They may 
touch deeper elements of the economy and regulatory systems and may even affect the existing 
system of social values.  
The Global Europe Strategy has served Europe relatively well since 2006. Its principal economic 
orientation and main components should perhaps remain in place if the EU is to continue to be com-
petitive in the future. Certainly, challenges have increased in recent years. One need only refer to the 
recent economic crisis (with increased protective non-tariff measures and discrimination against 
foreign commercial interests in different non-trade policy fields), or to the drive towards greener 
growth. By promoting a greater involvement of the European Parliament in trade policy decision-
making, recent Lisbon Treaty changes may also influence policy formation, as well as its values and 
priorities.  An updated trade policy will need to take these challenges into account. However, the EU 
must address these new realities while remaining fully aware of trade’s primary purpose – to generate 
long-term growth and employment in the European economy. The EU’s common commercial policy 
must work to support EU competitiveness and job creation. This is a crucial component of the EU’s 
2020 growth strategy. 
 
On the basis of the evaluation of the achievements and shortcomings of the EU’s current trade policy, 
in the second half of 2010 the European Commission started to prepare the intellectual background 
for discussions and consultations on a renewed strategy. As the first milestone in this process the 
Commission published a report assessing the Global Europe Strategy (“Report on progress achieved 
on the Global Europe Strategy, 2006-2010”4) and shortly thereafter, a deeper analysis that also incor-
porated recommendations for the future (“Trade as a driver of prosperity”5). These two working docu-
ments served a basis for the Commission communication, “Trade, Growth and World Affaires – Trade 
policy as a core component of the EU’s 2020 strategy”,6 which elaborated future directions for Com-
munity action in this field.  
 
The main elements of the EU strategy focus on delivering new market access through multilateral and 
bilateral trade negotiations and ensuring that that these policy goals are more efficiently enforced. The 
EU is strongly committed to concluding the WTO Doha Round. At the same time, the EU has taken a 
more strategic approach to its relationship with its major partner countries. The European Union 
needs a trade policy that will enhance the competitiveness of the European economy including, 
among other things, the regulation of raw materials and energy markets, tackling barriers to 
participation in international public procurement markets, addressing regulatory barriers to trade and 
investment, the creation of new business opportunities in green and digital technologies, ensuring full 
protection of intellectual property rights through stronger rules and improved enforcement. Finally, the 
EU wants to achieve a higher level of coordination between trade and other policies that have a direct 
bearing on EU commercial policy. 
 
 
 
                                                       
4 European Commission (2010a) 
5 European Commission (2010b) 
6 European Commission (2010c) 
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1.2. Main developments in EU-Latin American relations: co-
operation and trade aspects 
 
The strong shift in the EU approach towards improving institutional links with different partners has led 
to an intensification of relations with countries of the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region in 
recent years. The motivation behind this shift, besides renewing the trade policy of the EU, is the need 
to preserve and strengthen its position in the Latin American countries in a period when both these 
countries and their main partners (USA, Asian economies) show growing activity in creating free trade 
arrangements (FTAs) and establishing different cooperation schemes. In the recent period Latin 
America has undergone a major process of diversification in its international relations. Apart from the 
traditional relationship with the United States, there are increasingly important links between Latin 
America and the Asia-Pacific region. By upgrading and intensifying relations with Latin America, the 
EU tries to counterbalance the potential crowding-out effect of the emerging and already concluded 
FTAs by creating similar arrangements in the region. From the point of view of the Latin American 
countries there is a visible effort to preserve their position in the EU’s foreign policy agenda after the 
Eastern enlargement by strengthening political and economic ties with the enlarged EU. 
 
During the past two decades, EU-LAC relations have been shaped at bi-regional, sub-regional and 
country levels, with regular summits at highest level of the two regions as the main driver. Since 1999, 
the high-level political dialogue on topics of common interest pursued in the framework of the bi-
regional partnership has brought about a broad range of thematic dialogues and sectoral cooperation 
programmes. It has spurred negotiations on Association Agreements involving political dialogue, trade 
and cooperation. 
 
The EU has formulated its policy priorities towards Latin America and the Caribbean as follows:7  
- deepening political dialogue at bilateral, regional and multilateral level, 
- deepening mutually beneficial trade and investment ties, extending agreements serving these 
objectives, 
- furthering closer bilateral relations with individual Latin American countries while also suppor-
ting regional integration, 
- increasing dialogue on macro-economic and financial issues, environment, energy and scien-
ce and research, intensifying cooperation in these fields, 
- supporting the region’s efforts to reduce poverty and inequality and to pursue sustainable de-
velopment, 
- adapting cooperation programmes to cover innovative areas not addressed by traditional de-
velopment cooperation,  
- involving civil society in the Strategic Partnership through the EU-LAC Foundation. 
 
A wide range of agreements with individual countries and groups of countries in the region has been 
concluded, including Association Agreements with Chile and Mexico. A Strategic Partnership has 
been established with Brazil and Mexico. An Association Agreement with Central America, CARI-
FORUM-EU economic partnership agreement (EPA), as well as a trade agreement with Peru and 
Colombia have been signed. 
 
The above-mentioned arrangements are inserted in the broader framework of the EU-LAC bi-regional 
Strategic Partnership and dialogue. This framework was created by the first bi-regional Summit in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1999. Major decisions are made at those biannual summits, which have been held 
alternatively in Latin America and Europe, and are attended by member states’ representatives, in 
many cases at the highest level. Summits were held in Rio de Janeiro (1999), Madrid (2002), Guada-
lajara (2004), Vienna (2006), Lima (2008), Madrid (2010) and Santiago de Chile (2013). 
 
The Rio de Janeiro Summit launched the bi-regional Strategic Partnership and the EU-Mercosur and 
EU-Chile negotiations on an Association Agreement. The Madrid Summit launched the idea of promo-
ting an EU-LAC common area of higher education based on common programmes and on coopera-
tion between higher education institutions and on information society. The Guadalajara Summit con-
                                                       
7 http://eeas.europa.eu/la/index_en.htm 
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firmed social cohesion, effective multilateralism and regional integration as the strategic objectives of 
the partnership. The Vienna Summit launched the negotiations on an EU-Central America association. 
The Lima Summit resulted in the definition of the major axes of the bi-regional Strategic Partnership. 
The objective was to create a network of Association Agreements between the EU and the various 
sub-regional integration groups. The EU-LAC Summit in Madrid moved forward with this approach. In 
the declaration of this Summit the partners stressed their determination to favour an open and non-
discriminatory, rules-based multilateral trade system and fully respect its disciplines. They recognised 
its contribution in promoting the recovery from the economic crisis and in promoting growth and deve-
lopment.8 It adopted an Action Plan for the years 2010-2012 encompassing six priority areas:  
- science, research, innovation and technology,  
- sustainable development, environment, climate change, biodiversity and energy,  
- regional integration an interconnectivity, 
- migration, 
- education and employment, 
- the global drug problem.9 
 
The Santiago Summit in its declaration10 welcomed the new CELAC-EU dialogue, reaffirmed the 
shared values and positions in the international and multilateral arena, highlighted the progress in the 
bi-regional Strategic Partnership process, and launched the Alliance for Sustainable Development: 
Promoting Investments of Social and Environmental Quality. It deepened the partnership by elabora-
ting a new Action Plan for 2013-2015. The plan added two new priority areas (gender and investment) 
to the six focal areas of the 2010 Plan. It also identifies instruments and activities, which, if properly 
implemented, should lead to concrete results in cooperation in various new fields (such as science 
and innovation, sustainable development, migration, social cohesion, investments and entrepreneu-
rship).11 
 
 
2.  Trade policy framework 
 
2.1. Mexico 
 
Background 
 
Mexico has enjoyed membership in the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) for two decades. 
This agreement was signed in 1994 and prompted the EU to become more active in developing its 
relations with Mexico, one of its most important partners in Latin America. Shortly after the NAFTA 
arrangement the EU and Mexico concluded an Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and 
Cooperation Agreement in 1997. This framework agreement, often called Global Agreement, is an 
open-ended one, as it defines the main areas of relations and cooperation to be developed later. Its 
objective is to encourage the development of trade in goods and services, including a bilateral and 
preferential, progressive and reciprocal liberalisation of trade, taking into account the sensitive nature 
of certain products and service sectors. 
 
For this purpose the partners mandated the institutions of the agreement (Joint Council, Joint Commit-
tee and special committees) to elaborate appropriate measures to implement and extend the provi-
sions of the agreement. On this basis a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement was reached that 
entered into force in 2000 for the part related to trade in goods and in 2001 for that related to trade in 
services. 
 
 
                                                       
8 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/inta/dt/814/814925/814925en.pdf 
9 Grieger (2014) 
10 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/la/summits/docs/2013_santiago_summit_declaration_en.pdf 
11 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/la/summits/docs/2013_santiago_summit_eu-celac_action_plan_en.pdf 
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Content 
 
The Free Trade Agreement after a transitional period gradually established free trade covering subs-
tantial trade between the partners. It foresees that both parties will review and further liberalise trade 
in agricultural goods, additional fields of services and investment. The agreement includes provisions 
on access to public procurement market, on competition and intellectual property rights. It creates a 
solid basis for cooperation of the partners in a wide range of issues, such as industry, financial servi-
ces, fisheries, SMEs, energy, transport, tourism, innovation, culture etc. 
 
 
Relevance 
 
For Mexico the EU is the second biggest export market and third largest source of imports. The EU 
imports from Mexico minerals, machinery and electric equipment, transport equipment and precision 
instruments. The EU’s exports are dominated by machinery, transport equipments, chemicals and 
mineral products. In the service sector, the main fields of EU imports are sea transport, air transport 
and construction services, on the export side transport, computer and information services are the 
most important. The bilateral stock of direct investments and their flow between the partners is signifi-
cant.12 
 
For the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries Mexico (together with Brazil) is the largest 
trading partner in the Latin American region. Besides direct exports composed mainly of machinery, 
mechanical and electrical equipment, CEE companies enjoy liberalised access to the Mexican market 
as subcontractors of European production networks. In the imports of the CEE economies partly 
agricultural raw products and partly manufactured goods are the most important groups. Mexican 
agricultural exports are mainly of complementary character for CEE countries’ products. 
 
 
Table 1: CEE countries in trade between the EU and Mexico 
 
Countries Exports Imports 
2012, million euro 
Hungary 377.88 602.07 
Slovakia 85.14 25.03 
Czech Republic 357.96 150.59 
Poland 442.14 93.01 
Slovenia 48.01 9.6 
Romania 69.33 139.58 
Bulgaria 24.0 29.07 
Latvia 2.49 4.64 
Lithuania 10.75 38.37 
Estonia 110.5 5.49 
CEE total (billion euro) 1.5 1.1 
EU total (billion euro) 27.9 19.4 
CEE in total EU (%) 5.4 5.7 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations, Éltető (2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
12 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/mexico 
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2.2. Chile 
 
Background 
 
Chile was a member of the Andean Pact, the Andean Community’s predecessor, in the past but 
abandoned this membership during the years of military dictatorship. With the return to democracy, 
Chile proceeded to develop one of the most open economies, including free trade agreements with 
many countries and regions in the word. In 1990 the EU and Chile signed a first Framework 
Cooperation agreement. This agreement was followed in 1996 by another Framework Cooperation 
Agreement aiming at establishing in the future a political and economic association.13 The two 
partners concluded an Association Agreement in 2002, which included a comprehensive free trade 
agreement that entered into force in 2003. The complete Association Agreement after the ratification 
process became effective in 2005.  
 
The EU-Chile Association Agreement was the first in the series of the advanced FTAs of the EU 
concluded recently (e.g. with South Korea) or being under negotiations. It is seen as a model when 
the EU negotiates with countries at a similar level of development.14 
 
 
Content 
 
The Association Agreement is broad and covers all areas of EU-Chile relations, going well beyond 
WTO commitments. As far as trade policy provisions are concerned, the agreement stipulated the 
elimination of trade barriers after a transitional period of maximum 10 years. It established clear, 
stable and transparent rules for exporters, importers and investors. Besides free trade in goods, it 
covers free trade in services, and mutually opens the public procurement market. According to the 
provisions of the agreement, the parties achieved high levels of liberalisation of capital flows and 
investments. Specific provisions deal with strengthening the protection of intellectual property rights. 
The agreement also addresses standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedu-
res, thus taking a step towards partly eliminating non-tariff barriers to trade. A great number of coope-
ration fields have been defined by the partners.  
 
 
Relevance 
 
The free trade arrangement between Chile and the European Union led to a significant increase in 
trade in goods and services after its entry into force. Bilateral trade has more than doubled since 
2003, although its overall level is not very high. The EU is Chile’s second largest source of imports 
and the third largest export market. Key EU imports from Chile include mining products such as ores 
and non-ferrous metals, mostly copper, which traditionally represent around half of EU imports from 
Chile. The second most important sector in EU imports is agriculture, with a share of around a quar-
ter. Agricultural imports cover mainly fruits and vegetables, wines and fish products. The main product 
groups in the EU exports are machinery and electrical equipment, transport equipment, chemical 
products and fuel.15  
 
The CEE countries’ trade with Chile is rather low. Its structure on both sides is mainly similar to that of 
the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
13 Roy (2012), p.11. 
14 Woolcock (2007) 
15 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/chile 
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Table 2: CEE countries in trade between the EU and Chile 
 
Countries Exports Imports 
2012, million euro 
Hungary 25.14 5.92 
Slovakia 19.28 1.0 
Czech Republic 58.21 10.2 
Poland 55.08 65.38 
Slovenia 7.88 15.34 
Romania 15.28 - 
Bulgaria 6.23 - 
Latvia 5.54 4.21 
Lithuania 3.35 7.45 
Estonia 3.22 6.28 
CEE total (billion euro) 0.2 0.1 
EU total (billion euro) 8.5 9.7 
CEE in total EU (%) 2.4 1.0 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations, Éltető (2014) 
 
 
2.3. Peru and Colombia 
 
Background 
 
Colombia and Peru are founding members of the Andean Community (together with Bolivia and 
Ecuador), which emerged in 1996 as a successor of the Andean Pact. The EU initiated in 1996 a 
political dialogue with the Declaration of Rome, which was later consolidated with a Political Dialogue 
and Cooperation Agreement of 2003. However, this agreement has not yet entered into force since 
not all States parties have ratified it.  
 
The European Union intended to reach a new generation Association Agreement in its relations with 
the Andean Community on a region-to region basis, but in 2008 the partners failed to conclude the 
association between the groups of countries. This failure led to a change of approach on both sides 
and negotiations were initiated with individual countries. This case illustrates the difficulties and 
drawbacks of the region-to-region concept of the FTA. The EU’s regional partners often represent 
relatively loose groupings compared to the EU, who can find it difficult to coordinate and agree on 
common position. Intra-group dynamics can lower the level of ambition as negotiating partners settle 
for the lowest common denominator. In this case, introducing a bilateral dimension to the negotiation 
could yield better results, as the example of Peru and Colombia shows.  
 
Thus, negotiations began with Peru, Colombia and Ecuador in 2009. They were completed in 2010 in 
the cases of Peru and Colombia. Ecuador opted for a delay. As a result, the EU signed an ambitious 
and comprehensive Trade Agreement (called Multi-Party Trade Agreement, MPTA) with only two 
Andean countries in 2012. Contacts have been maintained to explore the possibility to include the 
other two members of the group, and negotiations with Ecuador have been reinitated. The MPTA with 
Colombia and Peru is provisionally applied since 2013. 
 
 
Content 
 
After full implementation of the agreement, it will open up markets on both sides, increasing stability 
and predictability of trade conditions. It provides for gradual, progressive and reciprocal liberalisation 
of trade in goods and services, for opening the government procurement market, as well as for 
creating a favourable environment for investments. The agreement partly addresses non-tariff 
barriers, technical regulations and standards. Provisions on intellectual property rights and 
transparency of competition rules, mainly those of state aid have been included in the agreement and 
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may facilitate the creation of a fair environment for European exporters and investors. Provisions for 
cooperation on competitiveness, innovation and technology transfer, as well as the ambition of 
partners to contribute to balanced and sustainable development of the Andean countries reflect the 
objective of helping these economies and local businesses to develop strength in the local market and 
to compete internationally. 
 
 
Relevance 
 
The structure of trade between the partners is highly concentrated. In EU exports, machinery, 
transport equipment and chemical products have predominant share, while imports are almost 
completely composed of agricultural and mining products and fuels.16 The agreement hopefully will 
facilitate diversification on both sides by allowing market presence of companies that have until now 
neglected these markets. 
 
Trade between CEE countries and the two Andean economies is rather low. Future liberalisation here 
also may open new opportunities. 
 
Table 3: CEE countries in trade between the EU and the two Andean countries 
 
Countries Exports Imports 
2012, billion euro 
CEE total 0.3 0.1 
EU total 11.7 17.8 
CEE in total EU (%) 2.6 0.6 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations, Éltető (2014) 
 
Table 4: CEE countries in trade between the EU and Peru 
 
Countries Exports Imports 
2012, million euro 
Hungary 9.12 - 
Slovakia 8.51 - 
Czech Republic 22.54 7.25 
Poland 40.4 12.69 
Slovenia - - 
Romania - - 
Bulgaria - 83.16 
Latvia 14.74 - 
Lithuania - 2.25 
Estonia - - 
CEE total (billion euro) 0.1 0.1 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations, Éltető (2014) 
 
Table 5: CEE countries in trade between the EU and Colombia 
 
Countries Exports Imports 
2012, million euro 
Hungary 16.57 21.09 
Slovakia 12.19 - 
Czech Republic 29.53 6.2 
Poland 36.29 - 
Slovenia 6.84 - 
Romania 141.82 7.43 
                                                       
16 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/andean-community 
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Bulgaria - - 
Latvia - - 
Lithuania - - 
Estonia - - 
CEE total (billion euro) 0.2 0.03 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations, Éltető (2014) 
 
 
2.4. Central America 
 
Background 
 
Contrary to the unsuccessful experience of region-to-region approach in the case of the Andean 
Community, the example of developing relations and reaching a regional agreement between the EU 
and the Central American countries highlights the fact that in some cases this approach can produce 
result and benefits for the participants. The Association Agreement between the EU and Central 
America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) marks an 
important step forward in relations between the two regions. The agreement includes a 
comprehensive trade part. Negotiations were concluded in 2010. The Association Agreement was 
signed in 2012. Now it is under ratification, but the trade provisions have been provisionally applied 
since the second half of 2013. It gives EU exporters access to a larger regional market under 
consistent conditions and enhances inter-regional trade for the partner countries. 
 
 
Content 
 
Once ratified, the Association Agreement will open markets on both sides, will help establish a stable 
business and investment environment and will foster sustainable development. The agreement rein-
forces regional economic integration in the Central American region and may have positive spill-over 
effect on the overall political stability. The agreement gradually, with a rather long transition period, 
largely eliminates customs tariffs, taking into account the sensitivity of certain sectors and product 
groups. It addresses non-tariff measures, enforces new trade disciplines, including intellectual pro-
perty rights and competition, simplifies procedures. It offers improved access to government procure-
ment, services and investment markets. Besides the trade pillar, the agreement relies on two other 
important pillars: political dialogue and cooperation. 
 
 
Relevance 
 
The Central American region traditionally maintains close relations with the United States. The biggest 
part of the trade of the six countries comes from there and goes to the American market. The share of 
the EU in the overall trade of the region is relatively small, around 10-12%. Nevertheless, recently an 
increasing diversification of the Central American trade flows can be observed. Imports of the EU 
reached the level of 10 billion euro in 2012. The main items are machinery and agricultural products. 
The level of exports remains lower, around 5 billion. It is composed mainly of machinery, transport 
equipment and chemicals.17 
 
Direct trade between Central American states and Central and Eastern European countries is 
extremely low, almost negligible. Statistical data may not register trade flows administered by 
intermediating Western European companies. 
 
 
 
                                                       
17 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/central-america 
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2.5. Caribbean countries 
 
Background 
 
The EU has developed special relations with the Caribbean countries using approaches and schemes 
very similar to those implemented in the case of Latin American economies, especially with the 
Central American region. In the historical past most of these countries were former colonies. The 
majority of the Caribbean states, 15 of them, are members of the Caribbean Community, often 
referred to as CARICOM or, within the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) framework, CARIFORUM 
(Forum of the Caribbean Group of ACP States). The Community was formed originally to follow the 
institutional example of the EU, but integration was slow and remained incomplete.18 From 1992 
onwards, CARIFORUM served as the framework to coordinate the benefits accorded by the EU to the 
Caribbean group of ACP countries under the Lomé Convention and later the Cotonou Agreement.  
 
After completing negotiations the EU and 15 Caribbean countries signed the CARIFORUM-EU 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), as a new form and framework of their cooperation. It was 
provisionally applied from December 2008 (when the WTO waiver to the EU’s system of unilateral 
preferences under Cotonou Agreement ended).  
 
 
Content 
 
The objective of the EU-CARIFORUM Economic and Partnership Agreement is to facilitate trade and 
investments, and to foster development by providing the 15 countries with preferential access to the 
EU market, in compliance with the WTO rules, and by improving economic governance and 
supporting regional integration. The EPA is in part a free trade agreement. It creates a more equal 
partnership. Before the EPA, only the Caribbean enjoyed preferential access to the EU, without any 
liberalisation in their import regime. The EPA establishes such obligations for both sides, as in any 
free trade agreement, but with very strong asymmetry. The EU grants free access for all products 
from the entry into force, the Caribbean countries have a 25-year transition to cut tariffs. Moreover, 
almost 20% of goods and services considered sensitive by the Caribbean countries, are excluded 
from this cut. The scope of the EPA besides trade in goods covers services, rules, competition, 
innovation, intellectual property, public procurement, environmental and labour standards. The EPA 
also offers EU financial support. 
 
 
Relevance 
 
In the short run, the EPA has not introduced immediate radical change in the trade rules between the 
partners. Trade levels and patterns remained stable in the past few years. The EU imports mainly 
mining products, sugar, bananas, minerals and fertilisers. The value of imports fluctuates around 4-
4.5 billions euro. Exports are around 5-6 billions and the main items are transport equipment, phone 
equipment, spirits and dairy products.19 
 
For the CEE countries direct trade flows are not relevant.  
 
 
2.6. Mercosur and Mercosur countries 
 
Mercosur 
 
Relations of the European Union and Mercosur serve as an example to illustrate how difficult it is to 
reach a bi-regional agreement with a group of countries with heterogeneous interests and different 
                                                       
18 Roy (2012) 
19 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/caribbean 
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approaches inside of the group. Even if the coordination of these approaches is successful, they often 
contradict the negotiating partner’s positions. These circumstances explain the rather long history of 
the planned Association Agreement between the two Communities.  
 
Mercosur was founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción and originally was composed of Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Venezuela joined the group later. These countries have been 
important trading partners of the EU, which is why shortly after the birth of the Latin American bloc in 
1995 the two Communities signed an Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement with the 
intention to further develop their relations and to achieve a higher level of liberalisation. FTA negotia-
tions were launched in 1999. Differences among EU Member States on regionalism versus multilate-
ralism20 slowed down the negotiations, as did differences between EU offensive interests in manufac-
turing and defensive interests in agriculture. The pace of negotiations was also slowed down by 
economic difficulties within Mercosur.21 Finally the process was suspended in 2004.  
 
Talks were re-launched in 2010 since the future agreement is of great interest to the EU, due to the 
high tariffs in Mercosur, which is the EU’s eighth trading partner. The Association Agreement would 
cover not only trade in industrial and agricultural products but also services, improvement of rules on 
government procurement, intellectual property, customs and trade facilitation, technical barriers to 
trade. Until now, rounds have focused on the part of the agreement related to rules and the two part-
ners are still working on the preparation of their market access offers. Until now no date has been set 
for the exchange of market access proposals.22 
 
The agreement would be highly relevant for both the EU and the CEE countries, not only because of 
substantial levels of trade in goods but also because of strong interests in services and investment. 
Among the members of the Latin American group Brazil is the biggest or the second biggest trading 
partner of the CEE states in the region. Nevertheless, some of the Central and Eastern European 
countries (especially those with important agricultural sector and high level of agricultural export to the 
EU members) may be cautious about the extent of liberalising agricultural market.  
 
 
Table 6: CEE countries in trade between the EU and members of Mercosur 
 
Countries Exports Imports 
 2012, billion euro 
CEE total 1.9 2.5 
EU total 50.7 56.3 
CEE in total EU (%) 3.7 4.4 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations, Éltető (2014) 
 
 
Argentina 
 
The bilateral relations between the EU and Argentina are governed by the Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement. It entered into force in 1990. The agreement is managed by a 
Joint Commission through periodic meetings. This country is the second market for the EU in 
Mercosur but also one of the important partners in Latin America. The EU exports mainly 
manufactured products and chemicals, while imports include primarily agricultural products and raw 
materials. The product structure of the CEE countries is rather similar to that of the EU.  
 
EU companies and investors face certain difficulties related to Argentina’s economic policy and 
protective measures of the past few years.23 In this situation any easing of the barriers seems 
beneficial and desirable, although difficult to achieve. 
                                                       
20 The trade policy documents of the Commission referred to in  he first chapter of the paper clearly reflect this dilemma. 
21 Woolcock (2007) 
22 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/mercosur 
23 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/argentina 
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Table 7: CEE countries in trade between the EU and Argentina 
 
Countries Exports Imports 
2012, million euro 
Hungary 35.46 11.26 
Slovakia 25.57 3.35 
Czech Republic 54.43 38.44 
Poland 89.75 497.06 
Slovenia 25.34 130.387 
Romania 21.52 44.6 
Bulgaria 4.95 10.15 
Latvia - 5.25 
Lithuania 28.04 37.6 
Estonia - 2.53 
CEE total (billion euro) 0.3 0.78 
EU total (billion euro) 8.6 10.0 
CEE in total EU (%) 3.5 7.8 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations, Éltető (2014) 
 
Brazil 
 
Relations between the EU and Brazil are regulated by a bilateral partnership agreement and a 
Strategic Partnership. By all measures, Brazil is the biggest partner of the EU in the Latin American 
region, regarding both trade and investments. For the CEE countries Brazil represents either the first 
or the second largest partner. The Brazilian market is relatively highly protected with high customs 
tariffs amounting to over 10% on average. Brazil is one of the most dynamic countries in the world 
economy. This explains the growing volume in EU and CEE trade during the period of economic crisis 
and recession in the EU.  
 
Imports of EU countries including CEE members consist to a large extent of agricultural goods and 
raw materials, but a steadily growing share of manufactured products also merits attention. EU 
countries traditionally are exporting manufactured products, transport equipment, and chemicals.24 
 
Table 8: CEE countries in trade between the EU and Brazil 
 
Countries Exports Imports 
2012, million euro 
Hungary 261.55 127.59 
Slovakia 79.97 27.95 
Czech Republic 319.13 86.03 
Poland 373.88 392.62 
Slovenia 41.98 398.9 
Romania 170.29 355.46 
Bulgaria 34.56 143.74 
Latvia 5.05 2.23 
Lithuania 14.81 29.48 
Estonia 37.26 36.46 
CEE total (billion euro) 1.34 1.6 
EU total (billion euro) 39.6 37.3 
CEE in total EU (%) 3.4 4.3 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations, Éltető (2014) 
                                                       
24 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/brazil 
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Paraguay 
 
The legal basis of relations between the EU and Paraguay is provided by the Framework Cooperation 
Agreement signed in 1992. The follow-up of the agreement is exercised by regular meetings of the 
Joint Commission. From the point of trade and investment Paraguay is a rather modest partner of the 
EU.25 For the CEE countries Paraguay is not among the important partners. Exports tend to zero, the 
level of imports is also rather low.  
 
Table 9: CEE countries in trade between the EU and Paraguay 
 
Countries Exports Imports 
2012, million euro 
Hungary - - 
Slovakia - - 
Czech Republic - - 
Poland - - 
Slovenia - 36.6 
Romania - - 
Bulgaria - - 
Latvia 4.75 - 
Lithuania - - 
Estonia - - 
CEE total (billion euro) 0.005 0.04 
EU total (billion euro) 0.5 1.0 
CEE in total EU (%) 0.8 1.0 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations, Éltető (2014) 
 
 
Uruguay 
 
As in the case of many Mercosur countries, the EU and Uruguay signed a Framework Cooperation 
Agreement in 1992. Until now it serves as the basis of cooperation.  
 
The volume of EU trade with this country is modest, but (especially in EU exports) is showing signs of 
growth. In recent years EU exports of services have been growing fast.26 For the CEE states Uruguay 
is the third Mercosur member in terms of the intensity of trade.  
 
In the case of this country the future Mercosur-EU agreement is likely to upgrade both trade and 
investment relations. 
 
Table 10: CEE countries in trade between the EU and Uruguay 
 
Countries Exports Imports 
2012, million euro 
Hungary 13.49 14.58 
Slovakia - - 
Czech Republic 9.81 - 
Poland 10.57 17.02 
Slovenia - - 
Romania - - 
Bulgaria - 4.79 
Latvia - - 
                                                       
25 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/paraguay 
26 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/uruguay 
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Lithuania 7.8 - 
Estonia 2.66 - 
CEE total (billion euro) 0.04 0.04 
EU total (billion euro) 1.7 1.2 
CEE in total EU (%) 2.4 3.3 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations, Éltető (2014) 
 
 
Venezuela 
 
There is no bilateral trade or cooperation agreement between the EU and Venezuela. This country 
has been an observer in the negotiations of an EU-Mercosur Association Agreement as a candidate 
country to Mercosur.27  
 
According to the EU Commission’s website, the ‘business climate in Venezuela remains challenging 
for EU operators due to the Venezuelan government's economic policy’.28 Despite this, trade flows are 
rather intense. This is true also for CEE countries, especially on the export side. 
 
 
Table  11: CEE countries in trade between the EU and Venezuela 
 
Countries Exports Imports 
2012, million euro 
Hungary 58.54 - 
Slovakia 49.91 - 
Czech Republic 16.25 - 
Poland 79.55 - 
Slovenia - 12.1 
Romania 30.84 - 
Bulgaria - - 
Latvia - - 
Lithuania - - 
Estonia - - 
CEE total (billion euro) 0.24 0.01 
EU total (billion euro) 6.5 4.5 
CEE in total EU (%) 3.7 0.2 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations, Éltető (2014) 
 
 
3.  The CEE countries and Hungary in the system of 
EU-LAC relations29 
 
3.1. Political considerations 
 
Before the political and economic transformation (i.e. before 1989-1990) the Central and Eastern 
European countries (those that were independent states), including Hungary, maintained a large 
system of bilateral political cooperation with Latin American countries and a broad system of 
diplomatic representation. Relations were based primarily on economic interests, but in many cases 
followed ideological motivations as well. During that time, the maximum number of Hungarian 
embassies reached 14. After the change of regime in Central and Eastern Europe all countries limited 
                                                       
27 Its full membership is pending on the ratification from the part of Paraguay 
28 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/venezuela 
29 This chapter is based among other sources on personal consultations with Hungarian diplomats who requested to preserve 
their anonymity. 
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their presence in Latin America and underrated the region in their foreign and economic policy 
agenda. This was due to several reasons: an ideological shift in their approach to diplomatic relations, 
the heavy financial burden of maintaining the existing network of embassies in a period of austerity, 
but most of all to their strong and almost exclusive focus on the ongoing process of integration into 
trans-Atlantic institutions (especially NATO) and the EU. As a consequence, their interest towards the 
Latin American countries and their diplomatic network substantially weakened. Until 2014, Hungary 
had only four embassies in Latin America. This year, the fifth embassy was reopened in Santiago de 
Chile. Similar process took place in the case of most CEE countries. Many of them did not have 
consistent foreign policy approach towards Latin America. The Hungarian government made public 
such a policy only in 2011. 
 
Membership in the EU necessarily ‘imported’ the problem of developing Latin American relations in 
the foreign policy of the CEE countries, and as one of the elements of the Common Commercial policy 
also began to matter in their trade policy approach. Participation in the EU working groups and 
committees opened the opportunity and at the same time pushed them to elaborate and reconsider 
their position on the issue, especially in the working group on political relations (COLAC) and in the 
Trade Policy Committee (TPC). Nevertheless, according to our consultation partners, except some 
questions (like developing political links with Cuba), the CEE countries are mainly and clearly policy-
takers. Although they may have common political interests (economic interests are more dispersed), 
common actions and positions are not typical.  
 
The CEE countries’ position (and that of Hungary) concerning the bi-regional system of EU-LAC 
relations is to some extent ambivalent. On the one hand, the EU’s ambitions to develop the framework 
and to upgrade the relations are in line with their general foreign policy interests. Latin American 
countries (at least some of them) as economic partners showing dynamic growth cannot be 
neglected. Moreover, some of the Latin American countries, especially regional powers, are 
increasingly active in addressing global political and economic issues (climate change, poverty, 
migration, organised crime, drug trafficking etc.), sometimes even taking initiatives at international 
fora. The LAC region represents a considerable voting power in the UN and in other international 
organisations. Its position influences the most important global political and economic decisions that 
affect the international community as a whole. No country is in a position to ignore the Latin American 
and Caribbean states. 
 
On the other hand, some criticism can be formulated concerning the bi-regional framework from a 
CEE point of view. The EU-LAC and the recent EU-CELAC framework is a “soft” one. It may initiate 
but is weak in practically implementing cooperation between partners. Individual countries can hardly 
achieve profit from these initiatives. The interests inside both regional groups are manifold and 
decisions to develop cooperation are not more than guidelines that often are not relevant for the CEE 
countries. EU-CELAC summits and CELAC itself do not have enforcing power. The same is true for 
the EU, as most of the cooperation field falls outside Community competence. Moreover, there is a 
feeling among some CEE countries that the initiatives elaborated by the Commission are motivated 
and influenced mainly by representatives of a few directly interested Member States and serve first of 
all their interests, not those of the CEE countries. Additionally, there is a sentiment that the feedback 
coming from the Commission to Member States is occasionally incomplete. This situation leads to 
limited interest and activity of the CEE countries in the bi-regional framework in order to benefit from 
the cooperation established by the EU-CELAC partnership. The same is valid for the cooperation 
chapters and cooperation objectives of the FTAs and Association Agreements. 
 
The cooperation activity of CEE countries is therefore based mainly on bilateral actions. The CEE 
states select only those political fields of cooperation that have relevance for them and neglect the 
others. At the same time, the selected fields are in line with and do not contradict the bi-regional 
objectives.  
 
In recent years, Hungary has made a certain shift in developing its international relations. This 
process took place under the so called policy of global opening. This policy focuses on trying to 
diversify economic and trade relations, as well as on upgrading bilateral political ties with non-EU 
countries, including Latin America. Steps were made to strengthen the Hungarian presence in the 
region through reopening former embassies (Santiago de Chile), opening consulates (São Paolo), 
  18 
extending the network of honorary consuls. A new forum has been created to animate cooperation 
between Hungary and Latin America, the Hungary-Latin America Forum. It had its first meeting in 
2012. The second is to be held in 2014. It focuses on three selected fields of cooperation: economy 
(improving the environment of cooperation, with special regard to SMEs), science and higher 
education. The future and time may prove if these steps can bring the expected results. Nevertheless, 
already successful programs have been launched in the field of higher education. In the bilateral 
framework called Sciences without Borders several hundreds of scholarships have been granted to 
Brazilian students. Parallel to that, under a Hungarian initiative, named Stipendium Hungaricum, 
Hungary has offered scholarships for another 250 Latin American students. Besides selected 
cooperation fields, in its bilateral Latin American policy, Hungary also tries to focus on selected 
countries: from economic point of view on Mexico and Brazil, from political considerations on leading 
political powers, like Brazil, and on countries with important Hungarian Diaspora (Venezuela, 
Argentina and Brazil).  
 
 
3.2. Economic considerations 
 
As Chapter 2 demonstrates, economic and trade interests of the CEE countries are limited and are 
concentrated only on a few countries. The EU’s agreement of the EU concluded with Mexico and 
Chile have been “inherited” by the CEE countries. The agreements concluded in the period after their 
accession have only weak relevance for them, leading them to play a role of policy-takers. 
 
Mexico is one of the most important partners of the CEE countries. The EU-Mexico FTA opened the 
way for eliminating industrial customs duties but is limited in the field of agricultural free trade, in 
investments and services, where it envisages only review clauses. For industry, the agreement 
facilitates export activities of European producers, where in most cases Eastern European companies 
are subcontractors of their Western European mother companies. The direct trade effect is limited. On 
the other hand, potentially increased competition can result from the opening of the EU’s industrial 
market. In some subsectors (e.g. the automotive industry), CEE companies have to face the 
competition of Mexican subcontractors. Agricultural concessions of the agreement do not have major 
disturbing effect for the CEE countries. The growing Mexican interest to upgrade the existing 
agreement (highly motivated by TTIP negotiations) would not provoke resistance of the CEE 
governments, except probably one field of further cooperation: investment protection. However, the 
EU, including the CEE countries prefer to discuss these questions with Mexico after the visible 
outcome of the TTIP negotiations anyway. 
 
The agreement under negotiation with Mercosur seems to be more problematic for the CEE countries. 
There are difficulties on both sides that explain the deadlocks and slow progress in the negotiation 
process. On the Mercosur side the major difficulties are related to the dissimilarity of the members 
from the point of view of economic philosophy and trade policy attitudes, as well as internal 
shortcomings of the Mercosur trade policy regime. On the EU side, the divergence of interests 
concerning the extent, trade coverage and the pace of market opening, especially in the agricultural 
sector, is evident. Some Member States, among them certain CEE countries (mainly Poland, 
Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and some others) are opposing any substantial agricultural trade liberali-
sation. In a few sectors (like beef, pork, poultry, bio-ethanol etc.), there is a feeling that radical liberali-
sation would risk provoking serious difficulties for these countries. The picture in questions linked only 
indirectly to trade in goods (investment, IPR, non-tariff barriers etc.) at this stage is very unclear, thus, 
a detailed position of the CEE countries (and that of the EU) is expected to be elaborated later. The 
two parties until now have not presented workable trade offers. Nevertheless, the EU-Brazil Summit in 
February 2014 confirmed that parties were on track to exchange market access offers on goods, 
services, establishment and public procurement. A change in the negotiation format to one similar to 
that seen with the Andean Community seems to have been ruled out, since Mercosur rules stipulate 
that individual members may not negotiate trade agreements unilaterally.30 Let us add that the EU 
mandate in force also excludes individual deals. 
 
                                                       
30 Grieger (2014) 
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By accession, the CEE countries have inherited the existing EU system of the GSP treatment. After 
accession, they were able to take part in and to influence the reform. Hungary’s strong standpoint in 
this process advocated for excluding those countries classified as upper middle-income countries 
from the preferences (e.g. Brazil, Argentina). This request, supported by many Member States was 
finally accepted. In the case of countries with FTAs or Association Agreement already in force, the 
former unilateral GSP concessions lost their relevance and were replaced by the free trade provisions 
of the agreements. Some countries without FTA (e.g. Equador, Bolivia, Paraguay) may keep their 
benefits from the revised GSP system. This situation has not produced new trade effects for the CEE 
countries. 
 
Through their accession to the EU, the CEE countries also became part of the EU’s development 
policy. They contribute to its most important financial element, the European Development Fund 
(EDF) with a minor key. They are also entitled to take part in the development actions. The develop-
ment funds of the EU to different degree are accessible for the Latin American countries. In the 2014-
2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) total contribution key of the CEE countries represents 
5.35%, which is not very high. The national development actions of the CEE countries (except ad hoc 
humanitarian actions) are focusing on regions other than Latin America and the Caribbean. The EU 
has elaborated a number of thematic instruments and programs covering also the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. These are, according to the recently accessed website of the Commission,31 the 
following: the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Nuclear Safety Coopera-
tion Instrument, DCI-Environment and management of natural resources, DCI-non-State actors and 
local authorities development, DCI-Food security, DCI-Migration and asylum, DCI-Investing in people, 
DCI-Restructuring sugar production, the EU food facility, and the Instrument for Stability. Personal 
consultations have shown that these instruments and programmes in relation to Latin America do not 
have practical meaning and relevance for Hungary, and probably neither for most of the CEE coun-
tries. Thus, the latter states are not among the (active) participants. Nevertheless, in the implementa-
tion of the EU’s development policy in general, the Hungarian authorities advocate for a more efficient 
aid policy of the EU, which can be achieved by stronger concentration of the resources and program-
mes, by better coordination and feedback, stricter monitoring and improved transparency. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The last decade has shown remarkable activity from both sides in developing relations between the 
Latin American and the Caribbean countries and the European Union. The growing interest of the 
partners to improve the political environment and trade policy elements of their cooperation can be 
explained by several factors. 
 
First, in the second half of the 2000s (in the “post-Lamy” period) the EU started to rethink and renew 
its trade policy position. After years of passivity the EU and the Commission regained their previous 
activity, dynamism and openness towards bilateral or regional free trade agreements. Second, Latin 
American countries tried to diversify their system of preferential agreements, probably in order to 
counterbalance the traditionally strong ties with the United States and also the growing influence of 
Asian countries. The EU, in this respect, was and is a natural partner. Third, in the years of economic 
crisis and recession in the internal market EU members started to rely increasingly on the markets of 
countries in dynamic regions of the world economy. Fourth, many Latin American countries have been 
able to offer such dynamic markets. This led to extending already existing trade policy frameworks 
and to creating new ones. 
 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, being new EU members, in many common policies 
played a role of policy-takers rather than policy-makers. Latin America, for several reasons, has not 
been in the focus of their trade policy aspirations. Nevertheless, they have been supportive in respect 
of improving trade conditions with this faraway region. They expect, as most of the Member States, 
better market access in Latin America for their direct exports (especially in Mexico and Brazil) and 
better access to raw materials. Since the level of direct trade is usually not substantial (except the two 
                                                       
31 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/thematic_en.htm 
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countries already mentioned), CEE companies as subcontractors of Western European producers 
expect to enjoy the benefits of liberalisation. On the other hand, market opening for Latin American 
products in sectors that are sensitive for the CEE countries (e.g. certain non-complementary type 
agricultural product groups) may result in a certain crowding-out effect from their traditional Western 
European markets. This may provoke cautiousness, reservation or even resistance from their part. 
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